ABSTRACT
Boko Haram terrorists has left over 8.5 million Nigerians in need of humanitarian assistance with over 20,000 death, over 1.8 million people displaced, an estimated 5.1 million Nigerians in need of food and nutrition as well as a financial burden estimated at $9 billion, leaving the country with the worst humanitarian crisis in the African continent. Thus, the Federal Government of Nigeria have approach the international community for assistance. The aim of this study is to assess the impact of lack of harmonization of humanitarian assistance by development partners on the reconstruction of North-Eastern Nigeria. This study is situated within the mixed method of research, drawing from both qualitative and quantitative design supplemented by historical and descriptive analysis. The data for this study were drawn largely from secondary sources including books, journals, official publications, newspapers, magazines and other internet sources. The data were analyzed using qualitative content analysis together with quantities tools such as tables, graphs and percentage analysis. This study is situated within the context of the Oxfam model of development assistance. We discovered that lack of harmonization of humanitarian assistance by development partners has lead to fragmentation of development partners’ support which in turn affect its success. Moreover, we suggest that a joint donor basket like the Joint Donor Basket (JDB) of the Democratic Governance for Development (DGD) Project should be established so as to allow for proper coordination of development partners support and enhance it effective implementation in order to achieve it desired impact.

KEYWORDS: Humanitarian Assistance, North-East, Security, Development Partners, Boko Haram,

INTRODUCTION
There is a long history of international efforts to help the victims of armed conflict and disasters areas. Over the years, the principles underlying these efforts have largely been enshrined in international law, especially humanitarian law. Besides, there were laws prohibiting the humiliation in Egypt and Persia in ancient times. Also, the first European rules on warfare were the Articles of War decreed in Sweden by king Gustavus II Adolphus in 1621 was enacted.

Nevertheless, the first comprehensive rules, defined in a document aimed at providing humanitarian assistance were the “Lieber Code”, which were adopted by the Union side in the American Civil War in 1863 and laid down the obligation to protect civilians. Also, Henry Dunant a Swiss who founded the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1863 after having witnessed devastation and lack of medical services at the battle of Solferino in modern-day Italy in 1859. Based on Henry Dunant’s ideas, the first universal rules of law in this area were defined in the first Geneva Convention of 1864. The Convention was subsequently revised several times, and the relevant documents in force today are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the two additional Protocols of 1977 and one additional Protocol of 2005 (MFA, 2004; ICRC, 2010).

Furthermore, other Protocols and instruments of international humanitarian law, refugee law, human rights, and legal instruments relating to natural disasters, and armed conflict as well as accepted international practice in this area are available today which are guided by the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) (www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org). By implication, donors will provide support needs-based,
flexible and predictable funding and, as far as possible, involve the affected population in the formulation, implementation, follow-up and evaluation of activities.

Besides, the modern concept and system of humanitarian assistance in academic literature can be traced to the impartial, independent and neutral provision of support to those in immediate danger. Also, it has only existed since the mid part of the 20th century. Although a system of international assistance first originated aftermath of World War I with the Treaty of Versailles, that provided the platform for accepted definition and key principles of humanitarian assistance which have only become part of conventional process since the 1990s (Davey, Borton, and Foley, 2013; Heather Rysaback-Smith, 2015).

However, the post-cold war humanitarian assistance began to be focused on developing countries as the ideas of development and underdevelopment began to take hold in modern society. Post WWII there was a sudden and unprecedented growth of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), humanitarian donor countries and regional organisations. In addition, the UN agencies, as well as the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, have developed and expanded their scope of engagement in affected states. In addition, there is recent increasing support from the military and private organizations and foundations all over the world for humanitarian assistance.

Moreover, humanitarian assistance is one of the most effective and practical short term measures of addressing the increasing state of armed conflict, natural disasters and other disaster situations in the world today. As such, due to the increasing humanitarian needs and growth of humanitarian assistance across the globe, as well as a larger and more diversified group of actors, makes an increased international coordination and a strong, efficient and effective international humanitarian system even more important today (MFA, 2010a).

As there is increasing numbers of NGOs all over the world today, they have been advertising campaigns with images of starving children, especially in Africa; these images became the dominant Western idea of humanitarian assistance which tends to persist to this day. In addition, the rapid growth of NGOs and donor agencies has been attributed to many causes, including increased need in the post-colonial era, the proliferation of both natural and manmade disasters and an increasingly integrated global system.

Today, humanitarian assistance has become more global with increasing advances in transportation and communication, and began to shift from Europe to the less developed parts of the world. Moreover, the dimensions of humanitarian assistance in contemporary times are complex, with hundreds if not thousands of NGOs and other organizations from many countries providing a variety of supports and development efforts. Today, both armed conflict and natural disasters affect an ever increasing number of people (Heather Rysaback-Smith, 2015).

Until 2005 there were only five main groups of organisations spending humanitarian assistance funds: international NGOs, domestic governments and organisations, UN funds agencies and programmes, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and government donors. Each element within these groups has a different mandate, capacity and priority which they seek to achieve. Also, central to humanitarian assistance is that it goals include not only the reduction of poverty but also human development, environmental protection, human rights, humanitarian disaster relief and assistance to refugees etc (Jega, 2007).

However, one of the motivations for development partners’ support for humanitarian assistance in Northeastern Nigeria has been attributed to the damages done by the Boko Haram insurgency in the region. The prolonged conflict perpetuated by Boko Haram group in northeast Nigeria has spurred massive displacement and undermined food security. Though, efforts have been made by the Federal Government of Nigeria to curbing the increasing state of insecurity in the region since 2009 when the group emerged but with progress made so far, the Federal Government of Nigeria requested for international support to combat the Boko Haram group in the affected states in the area of military hard ware and other humanitarian assistance.

On the 27th of October, 2015 the Federal Government of Nigeria announced the North East Marshall Plan (NEMAP) aimed at providing “intermediate and long-term interventions in emergency assistance, economic reconstruction and development” that is central in bringing peace to the Northeastern region. The first action of this ambitious plan should target camps for the displaced. In order to rebuild state legitimacy,
the authorities should scale down reliance on security forces to manage the camps and give greater room to civil authorities.

It was against this background that development partners like the United Nations, USAID local NGOs and other International Non Governmental Organizations began to show commitment in helping the Nigerian government in addressing the challenges of insecurity in the Northeastern region of the country.

LITERATURE REVIEW
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

In academic literature in the past and even in contemporary terminology in “humanitarian assistance” the concepts of "disaster", "emergency" and "humanitarian" are often combined with the words "assistance", "aid", "relief" and "activities/operations". The concepts based on these combinations of words are interchangeable (Heather Rysaback-Smith, 2015).

Therefore, the term humanitarian assistance dates from the nineteenth century, ‘a historical investigation of the term “humanitarian” is made problematic by the fact that it was only in the last decade of the twentieth century that it came into wide and frequent circulation’ (Davies, 2012: 1). In effect, the understanding of ‘humanitarian’ that became dominant in the 1990s has sought to define ‘humanitarianism’ as ‘the impartial, independent, and neutral provision of relief to those in immediate danger of harm’ (Barnett, 2005: 724; 733).

Duffield (1994: 3) provided a more assertive definition humanitarian assistance when he asserts that:

“So-called complex emergencies are essentially political in nature: they are protracted political crises resulting from sectarian or predatory indigenous responses to socioeconomic stress and marginalisation. Unlike natural disasters, complex emergencies have a singular ability to erode or destroy the cultural, civil, political and economic integrity of established societies”
(Duffield, 1994: 3).

Similarly, Heather Rysaback-Smith (2015) defined humanitarian assistance as the act of providing material assistance to people in need has existed throughout human history, often in the form of food or material aid provided during famine, drought or natural disaster. According to the Swedish government humanitarian assistance is considered as efforts to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming, affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster situations, which are severe impediments to populations’ or entire communities’ supply and survival mechanisms (MFA, 2010a).

The conceptualization of humanitarian assistance provided by the Swedish government is arguably based on the “Objectives and definition on humanitarian action” agreed on by representatives of government and multilateral donors, United Nations institutions, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and other organisations involved in humanitarian action, at the International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship, Stockholm, 2003.

There are four basic principles that govern humanitarian assistance: Humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. These principles were formally established by the UN General Assembly in 1991 (humanity, impartiality and neutrality) and 2004 (independence) and numerous recognized international documents elucidate and expound upon these principles. For instance, UNGA Resolution 46/182, 19th December 1991, which states: “Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.” Independence was also recognized as a guiding principle for the provision of humanitarian assistance in 2004 (UNGA Resolution.8/114, 5 February 2004).

To elucidate on the expansion of these four basic principles that guides humanitarian assistance by the United Nations. Humanity refers to the provision of aid to all who are in need, wherever the need exists, with the purpose to protect and respect all human beings. Neutrality is the responsibility of aid organizations not to choose sides in conflict or to favor a particular political, religious or ideological bent. Impartiality demands aid be given based on need alone and based on any other distinctions including gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, class, political party or religious belief. Finally, independence refers to the requirement
that aid organizations are autonomous from any political or military objectives or with those goals in mind (Heather Rysaback-Smith, 2015:5-6).

The UN Code of Conduct, signed by over 492 humanitarian organizations, provides a set of common standards for donor agencies involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance and a commitment to the four principles. The code establishes humanitarian assistance as a right to be provided to citizens of all countries, regardless of race, creed or nationality; without political agenda and with the preservation of the recipient’s dignity and respect for the recipient’s culture. It also delineates the need for transparency, capacity building and long-term planning for rebuilding and prevention of future disasters (Heather Rysaback-Smith, 2015).

THE ORIGIN OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

In the 1980s, pioneering publications traced the evolution of international humanitarian frameworks (Kent, 1987; Macalister-Smith, 1985). Barnett (2005) identifies ‘an imperial humanitarianism, from the early nineteenth century through World War II; a neo-humanitarianism from World War II through the end of the Cold War; and a liberal humanitarianism, from the end of the Cold War to the present’ (Barnett, 2011: 29). Besides, Walker and Maxwell (2009) view the world wars as marking distinct changes in the story of the humanitarian sector; they characterise the period of the Cold War as one of ‘mercy and manipulation’ and the 1990s as the period of the ‘globalization of humanitarianism’. Focusing on disaster relief, Kent (1987: 36) sees the Second World War as a turning point, arguing that ‘it was only in the midst of World War II that governments began to fully appreciate the need for greater international intervention in the plight of disaster-stricken people’. This mirrors the chronology proposed by the influential historian Eric Hobsbawm (1994), who divided up the ‘short twentieth century’ into two major eras, 1914–45 and 1946–89. French accounts of humanitarianism, in contrast, have often emphasised the importance of the Cold War period and specifically the Biafra/Nigeria Civil War (1967–70) in promoting emergency relief (Ryfman, 2008: 19; Aeberhard, 1994; Davey, 2012).

Davey, Borton, and Foley, (2013) identified four main periods from the mid-nineteenth century until the end of the First World War in 1918, when nineteenth-century conceptions drove humanitarian action; the ‘Wilsonian’ period of the interwar years and the Second World War, when international government was born and then reasserted; the Cold War period, when humanitarian actors turned more concertedly towards the non-Western world and the development paradigm emerged; and the post-Cold War period, when geopolitical changes again reshaped the terrain within which humanitarians worked.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMME

In the literature some work has been done on the cost created by development and humanitarian assistance proliferation and fragmentation such as Easterly, (2002); Djanakv, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, (2005); Burnside, & Dollar, (2000); Harford and Klein, (2005); Acharya, DeLima and Moore, (2006); Hayter, T. (1971), Roodman, (2006), Akor and Momoh, (2015) and Momoh, (2017).

Moreover, other research works conducted on issues such as conflict response, natural disasters, refugees and displacement and humanitarian intervention has greatly added to our understanding of significant actors and moments among which are Collingham, 2011; Shephard, 2010; Caron and Leben, 2001; Mauch and Pfister, 2009; Gatrell, 2005 and 2013; Skrnan and Daugtry, 2007; Simms and Trim, 2011; Wheeler, 2000. However, all these works does not focus on humanitarian assistance provided by development partners on the North-Eastern part of Nigeria.

On the whole, this study identify gap in the literature as no recent studies have been conducted on the implications of lack of harmonization of humanitarian assistance by development partners on the reconstruction of affected North-Eastern part of Nigeria by the Boko Haram insurgency.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

In the International Political Economy literature a numbers of models have been developed by Scholars and Researchers alike to explain the pattern and flow of humanitarian assistance. Goldstein and Pevehouse (2008:495-500) have identified three models of humanitarian assistance which they distinguished
by the type of assistance provided rather than the type of donors that provided them. These models fall within the purview of both the government and private organizations.

A. The Disaster Relief Model

The disaster relief model is that type of humanitarian assistance provided to the poor who are affected by famine, drought, earthquake, war, flooding, or other such natural disasters. The disaster relief model therefore, provide a short-term relief to people who are left with no means of subsistence usually without the basic necessities of life like food, cloth, water and shelter among others.

This model is important in explaining the motivations for development partners support for areas ravaged with natural disasters as natural disaster has the capacity to destroy years of hard earned economic growth and development by a country. To this end the international community through the United Nations and other multi-lateral platforms often respond with adequate relief materials in order to alleviate the suffering of the people and possibly bring the affected people back on their feet.

The disaster relief model is adopted by the United Nations through the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRC) located in Geneva. Besides, in 2006, the United Nations set up a US$500 million to enable it respond quickly to disasters without waiting to raise fund fist each time disaster strikes. Also, the United States government have adopted the disaster relief model through it Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) which is aspect of the USAID.

Furthermore, the relationship between disaster and economic development in any state is complex, and appropriate responses differs base on the location, type and size of the disaster in question and the phase of recovery. For instance, refugees, displaced from their homes, communities have different needs from those of earthquake, victims whose entire homes, and communities have been destroyed. Thus, different resources are required in an emergency phase like food and medical supplies than in the reconstruction phase like earthquake resistant housing design.

Lastly, despite the usefulness of the disaster relief model it cannot be used to explain, describe and prescribe the nature, motivation and implications of development partners support via humanitarian assistance to Northeastern states affected by the Boko Haram insurgency.

B. The Missionary Model

The Missionary Model involves humanitarian assistance provided by missionaries based on charitable work in poor nations across the globe. Besides, such charitable gesture or programmes are helpful, though not without it challenges. They are means by which donors from developed countries channel their resources to people in developing countries who are in need of humanitarian assistance.

However, many programmes provided by most missionaries are to address short term needs which may not create sustained local economic development. Besides, most of these programmes do not address the root cause of poverty. One of the missionary assistance provided in Africa was carried out by Catholic Relief Services (CARE) that funded a healthy fraction of their budget by selling to African countries some grain they ship from the United States. The charities is becoming international grain merchants and flooding local markets with cheap food which sold and given away, compete with local farmers in Africa and drive down local prices and harming long-term recovery (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008:495).

Finally, one major short coming of the missionary model is that large scale humanitarian assistance provided to the people in the developing nations may not be appropriate to meet the needs of the local condition and culture of the people in need of humanitarian assistance.

C. The Oxfam Model

The Oxfam model to the study of humanitarian assistance derived it name from a private charitable group called Oxfam based in America. Oxfam is one of the seven groups worldwide descended from the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief founded in 1942 in Britain. From the inception, Oxfam was devoted to short-term aid to famine victims and is still active in its effort.

Over the years, Oxfam America realized that in the long term people needs may just be handouts of food but the means to feed themselves like land, water, seed and technical training may not be attainable. Besides, one distinctive aspect of the Oxfam model is that it relies heavily on local communities to determine the needs of their own people and to carry out development project.

It is pertinent to note that within the context of the Oxfam model, humanitarian assistance is between donors and recipients as “project partners” working together to achieve a task. According to this model,
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees states that the Boko Haram insurgency had created a crisis that forced millions of people to flee into neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger, after having been forced to flee (www.usaid.gov/nigeria/food-assistance). An estimated 2.1 million people fled their homes at the height of the insurgency. An estimated 1.7 million people are hitherto internally displaced and close to 200,000 people are still in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, after having been forced to flee (www.reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/north-east-nigeria-humanitarian-situation-update-january-2018).

In 2018, an estimated 7.7 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. The worst-affected states in Nigeria are Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, with an estimated 6.1 million people targeted for humanitarian assistance. It is nine year now, the crisis shows no sign of abating. In January 2018 the number of IDPs shows that Gwoza (3,842), Mobbar (2,950), Nganzai (2,583), Monguno (2,141), Ngala (1,903), Mubi South (783), Konduga (675), Askira/Uba (560), Kukawa (460), and Bama (421). Between late October 2017 and late January 2018, over 40,000 vulnerable persons have been on the move for various reasons including ongoing hostilities, improved security in certain areas and poor living conditions (www.usaid.gov/nigeria/food-assistance). As at February 2018, International Organization for Migration and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees states that the Boko Haram insurgency had displaced more than 1.6 million people within Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states and forced over 214,000 Nigerians to flee into neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger (www.usaid.gov/nigeria/food-assistance).

Today, there are many donor agencies working in Northeastern Nigeria through the provision of humanitarian support to millions of people affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in the region. However, donors humanitarian assistance is not a charity rather it is in the interest of the both the donors and recipients. It is perceived as a cooperative relationship between the donors and recipients that are vital for peaceful and development of the world.

The Oxfam model re-conceptualized humanitarian assistance to focus on long-term development through a bottom-up but needs strategy. The Oxfam model sees “Genuine development” within the context that it:

“enable people to meet their essential needs, extends beyond food aid and emergency relief; reverses the process of impoverishment; enhances democracy; makes possible a balance between population and resources; improves the well-being and status of women; respect local cultures; sustain the natural environment, measure progress in human, not just monetary terms; involve change, not just charity; requires, empowerment of the poor; and the Global North as well as the South” (Oxfam American News, 2008 cited in Potter, Bins, Elliot, & Smith, 2004).

Furthermore, the Oxfam model has the advantage of promoting the trend towards grass root empowerment, thereby overcoming the dangers of external run programme under disaster relief and missionary models. However, the Oxfam model has been tested in a small scale. Though, the model may be effective in the local communities it reaches. It would have to be adopted widely and replicated on a large scale in order to influence the overall prospects for development. Oxfam model tries to minimize the role in its projects of governments in both the developed and developing countries. Thus, the Oxfam model does not accept government funds nor does it make grants to governments. Therefore, the Oxfam model bypasses governments and also bypasses the majority of money spent on humanitarian assistance globally (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008:499-500). On the whole, we adopt the Oxfam model to our study of development partners, humanitarian assistance and quest for reconstruction of Northeastern Nigeria.

COST ANALYSIS AND HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT IN NORTHEASTERN NIGERIA

It is a well-known fact that Northeastern part of Nigeria is presently faced with humanitarian challenges arising from Boko Haram insurgency since 2009. These challenges have led to widespread displacement of people who mostly take refuge in schools and other public places, violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, protection risks and a deepening humanitarian crisis. Nine years now, the crisis shows no sign of abating and is adding to the long history of marginalization and chronic under-development as well as a higher rate of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment (www.nema.gov.ng/north-east-humanitarian-challenges-matters-arising/).

Since the start of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009, more than 20,000 people have been killed, thousands of women and girls abducted and children drafted as so-called "suicide" bombers into the insurgency. An estimated 2.1 million people fled their homes at the height of the insurgency. Besides, an estimated 1.7 million people are hitherto internally displaced and close to 200,000 people are still in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, after having been forced to flee (www.reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/north-east-nigeria-humanitarian-situation-update-january-2018).

In 2018, an estimated 7.7 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. The worst-affected states in Nigeria are Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, with an estimated 6.1 million people targeted for humanitarian assistance. It is nine year now, the crisis shows no sign of abating. In January 2018 the number of IDPs shows that Gwoza (3,842), Mobbar (2,950), Nganzai (2,583), Monguno (2,141), Ngala (1,903), Mubi South (783), Konduga (675), Askira/Uba (560), Kukawa (460), and Bama (421). Between late October 2017 and late January 2018, over 40,000 vulnerable persons have been on the move for various reasons including ongoing hostilities, improved security in certain areas and poor living conditions (www.usaid.gov/nigeria/food-assistance). As at February 2018, International Organization for Migration and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees states that the Boko Haram insurgency had displaced more than 1.6 million people within Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states and forced over 214,000 Nigerians to flee into neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger (www.usaid.gov/nigeria/food-assistance).

Today, there are many donor agencies working in Northeastern Nigeria through the provision of humanitarian support to millions of people affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in the region. However,
one of the many challenges has being the inability of the government to know the exact number of such donor agencies. This has been attributed to poor coordination on the part of relevant authorities that have not properly plan and harness all available resources in a systematic way.

According to ICRC record, 15, 438 children that could have died for lack of care were delivered in Red Cross supported clinics in the Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. Not less than 12, 821 children under the age of five suffering from severe acute malnutrition were also treated in these clinics. Those wounded by Boko Haram insurgents or during cross fire between troops and insurgents were also treated by the surgical teams. A total of 1,765 patients so wounded treated in facilities Maiduguri between January-December 2016 alone. Many have been treated since the beginning of 2017 (www.icirnigeria.org/aid-agencies-avert-humanitarian-tragedy-north-east/).

There was an increase in the number of development partners’ support for the reconstruction of northeastern Nigeria since March 2015, from 19 to 62. However, the entire humanitarian supports provided by the development partners are still constrained by lacks of rapid response capacity (Humanitarian Responses Plan, 2016). According to the governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima, there are about 62 officially registered aid agencies and NGOs operating in the North East. Besides, Governor Shettima also asserts that there are more than a hundred development partners operating in the region providing humanitarian support (https://www.icirnigeria.org/aid-agencies-avert-humanitarian-tragedy-north-east/).

Presently, there are 62 humanitarian organizations operating in the four focus states of north-east Nigeria in support of a Government-led response, by the National Emergency Management Agencies (NEMA). This includes 27 international non-governmental organizations (INGOs); 19 national NGOs; 11 United Nations offices, agencies funds and programmes; three Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Organizations; and one inter-governmental organization. The establishment of United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) in September 2015 has increased the humanitarian footprint in the four most affected states in the northeastern region of Nigeria (Humanitarian Responses Plan, 2016).


As at the end of 2015, an estimated 3.9 million people in north-east Nigeria out of a total of 5.2 million across the Lake Chad Basin were in urgent need of food assistance. Of the $248 million required for the emergency response in north-east Nigeria in 2016, less than 20 per cent was available by May. Donor pledges were higher for Chad and Niger, where the number of persons in need was smaller (www.reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-facts-figures-2017). Approximately 71 per cent of the US$743 million out of $1.05 billion budgeted for the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) was received. The humanitarian response in Nigeria was one of the worlds best funded in 2017 (www.reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/north-east-nigeria-humanitarian-situation-update-december-2017).

In July 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari established a Presidential Committee on North-East Interventions (PCNI) to coordinate domestic and international humanitarian efforts. However, since 2016, development partners have agreed to refocus their response on the four states in the north-east of Nigeria affected by the Boko Haram insurgency such as Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe in order to abate the underlying risk factors, drivers and root causes of the insecurity in the region. For instance, the World Food Program (WFP) supported fewer than 2,000 people in the north east in March 2016; that figure had increased to 50,000 in May, 2016 but was still way behind target given that more than half of the 1.5 million IDPs just in Maiduguri are judged by the UN to be malnourished, and the situation in rural areas is often worse. Similarly, the United Nations agencies have provided assistance for an estimated 90 per cent of the most food insecure people in the Northeast (https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-facts-figures-2017).
On the tide of rising awareness and growing concern about the unfolding crisis, the response was scaled up rapidly in the last quarter and the 2016 humanitarian response was moderately funded. Fifty two percent of the $484 million dollars required for the response was realised. The crucial food sector set out to provide food assistance to 1,500,000 people in December 2016. By the 24th of the month, they had reached 1,868,850 people; a staggering increase from approximately 160,000 people reached in September 2016 (Humanitarian Response Plan, 2017).

The Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC) in partnership with the UN World Food Programme (WFP) oversaw the significant increase in general food distribution, increasing the targeting from approximately 160,000 people in September to targeting 1 million in December 2016. Also, 1,868,850 people had been fed by the end of December 2016. A substantial increase in UNICEF’s activities from 9th November – 31st December 2016 has also delivered tangible results (Humanitarian Response Plan, 2017).

The Federal Government of Nigeria on the 27th October, 2017 unfolded North East Marshall Plan (NEMAP) which was a short, intermediate and long term interventions in economic reconstruction, development and emergency assistance at projected total budgetary expenditure of N92.2 billion for the Northeastern part of the country ravaged by the Boko Haram insurgency. Moreover, the critical intermediate plan is for the over two million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Besides, the long-term implementation of NEMAP will also cost N116.4 billion in addressing the needs of non-returning IDPs in the affected states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Furthermore, in a bid to end the Boko Haram insurgency, the Federal Government of Nigeria has developed and unveils a strategic national communication plan to counter the ideology and teaching of the terror outfit and other such groups (www.guardian.ng/news/fg-unfolds-n92-2-billion-marshall-plan-for-n-east/).

The Federal Government of Nigeria’s (FGN) Inter-Ministerial Task Force (IMTF) was established to create a platform to support the Federal Government humanitarian response in the north-eastern region of the country. The IMTF brings together sector leads and international humanitarian partners responding to the crisis. In addition to this, the Presidential Committee for the Northeast Initiative’ (PCNI) requested 108 Billion Naira for 2017 and this was just one of the many MDA’s already at work in the North-East. The 36 state governments in Nigeria have long been directing considerable resource to the humanitarian response and have provided in kind support to the international response (Humanitarian Response Plan, 2017).

Humanitarian assistance deliveries in the affected Northeastern states increased significantly in 2017. For instance, over 1.6 million people and 2.5 million people received food assistance in January and November, 2017 respectively. Livelihoods and agricultural support has also increased tremendously, with more than 2 million people assisted each month since September 2017. However, food assistance deliveries declined in December 2017, to over 2 million people reached due to decrease in funding (www.fews.net/west-africa/nigeria/key-message-update/january-2018).

Available records has it that development partners have provided livelihood assistance and training to over 1,152,000 people in Nigeria’s North East and middle belt regions. Together with other Red Cross societies in the Lake Chad region, more than 13,200 people on behalf of their families. In May 2017 out of the 82 released “Chibok girls” upon the request of both the Government of Nigeria and the Boko Haram group that had held them, without taking part in negotiations that led to their release. Also, 450,000 people in the North-East and Middle Belt received food for three months or longer; 500,200 returnees and residents isolated in conflict areas received seeds, machinery, & tools for farming; 130,500 people, including widows, received cash and basic training on small businesses; More than 581,300 patients including 55,400 children attended 25 ICRC-supported primary health care centres and 4 mobile clinics; 17,300 casualties were treated and evacuated by the Nigerian Red Cross Society first aid teams and Over 860,000 displaced persons, returnees, and residents gained access to clean water (https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-facts-figures-2017)

Although 2017 saw many positive developments such as the containment of the cholera crisis in Borno State, the establishment of five humanitarian hubs in the field, the roll-out of a local coordination mechanism, and many sectors reaching their targets overall without sustained assistance, all gains could be lost and the situation could quickly deteriorate.

The Nigerian private sector have also been mobilised to come to the aid of those in need and billions of naira have been contributed either in cash or in kind towards the response. This Nigerian owned and led
response in the region means the international component of the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan is seeking $1 billion which is a fraction of what would normally be requested for a humanitarian crisis of this magnitude. For example, Syria’s 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan requires $3.4 billion (Humanitarian Response Plan, 2017).

Available record has it that Nigeria has historically received more development assistance than humanitarian assistance. For instance, in 2013 humanitarian assistance to Nigeria represented 3% of the total US$1.8 billion of official development assistance (ODA) to the country. Besides, Nigeria was ranked 22nd largest Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) recipient in 2014, with an estimated US$5 million allocated representing 1.1% of the global CERF received. Moreover, 65% of this fund representing US$3.3 million was budgeted to address the challenges of the Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in the affected northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe state. However, in 2015 Nigeria did not receive any Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) (Stirk & Spencer, 2015).

The USAID Office of Food for Peace (FFP) works with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to respond to the urgent food needs of approximately 831,000 people by distributing locally purchased food, targeted cash transfers and food vouchers in Borno and Yobe states. This in-kind and market-based assistance is increasing household access to food while bolstering dietary diversity and fostering the recovery of local economies (www.usaid.gov/nigeria/food-assistance).

Through its partner the UN World Food Program (WFP), FFP provides market-based food assistance as well as in-kind food sourced from U.S., Nigerian and regional stocks to food-insecure Nigerian populations. FFP also enables WFP to furnish fortified supplementary food to children and pregnant and lactating women to prevent acute malnutrition. With support from FFP, WFP has reached approximately 1 million Nigerians per month with emergency food assistance since December 2016 (www.usaid.gov/nigeria/food-assistance).

FFP’s partners also conduct complementary nutrition programming that helps families use locally available foods to meet nutritional requirements. Activities include nutrition screenings and referrals, cooking demonstrations and infant and young child feeding counseling sessions. In collaboration with the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), FFP also provides in-kind, ready-to-use therapeutic food to treat children suffering from severe acute malnutrition (www.usaid.gov/nigeria/food-assistance).

**Table 2 Food for Peace contributions (US Dollars)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US Dollars</th>
<th>Metric Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>$68 million</td>
<td>24,045 Metric Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>$250.9 million</td>
<td>121,777 Metric Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>$50.8 million</td>
<td>2,692 Metric Tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2 above show that in 2018 USAID is expected to spend US$ 68 million to provide 24,045 metric tons of food for people in need of humanitarian assistance in the affected Northeastern states. In 2017, US$250.9 million was spent to purchase 121,777 metric tons of food for people in need of humanitarian assistance in the affected Northeastern states and in 2016, US$ 50.8 million was spent to provide 24,045 metric tons of food for people in need of humanitarian assistance in the affected Northeastern states.

Moreover, 60 development partners have shown commitment to implementing 173 projects aimed at providing in life-saving assistance to 6.1 million women, children and men in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states. The total funding requirement for 2018 by development partners is estimated at US$1.05 billion. Although funds received in 2018 are extremely low for most sectors as of 31 January 2018, with only 1 per cent ($13 million) of the requirements met, most partners were able to continue to provide life-saving assistance in January with $196 million carry-over funding from 2017 (www.reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/north-east-nigeria-humanitarian-situation-update-january-2018).

**Figure 1 Historical Trends of Humanitarian Funding by Donors in Nigeria (US$ millions)**

41
From figure 1 above the total humanitarian funding to Nigeria increased from 15.6 US$ million to 28.7 US$ million in 2013 to 44.3 US$ million in 2014 almost triple. However, 2015 witnessed a sharp decrease to 11.5US$ million while 2017 witnessed a sharp increase to 743 US$ as humanitarian support by donors to Nigeria as part of their commitment in addressing humanitarian crisis in the northeast region.
Figure 2 Top 10 Development Partners Support in Nigeria (2012-2015) (US$ millions)

Source: Data obtained from Stirk and Spencer, (2015) and compiled by the Author

From figure 2 above shows that the European Union top the chart of the largest contributors of donors with US$ 47.6 million. The United States came second on the chart with a contribution of US$12.1 million, others are CERF US$ 11.4 million, Japan US$ 8 million, Private donors US$ 7.7 million, Germany with US$ 2.9 million, Norway with US$ 2.8 million, Sweden with US$ 2.5 million, AfDB with US$ 1 million and France with the least contribution of US$ 0.9 million.
Figure 3 above shows that a total of six development partners have made commitment and contributions worth US$ 11.5 million to support humanitarian services. Besides, Japan remains the largest contributor to humanitarian assistance in Nigeria worth US$ 4 million representing 35% of the total contributions made in 2015. Japan also made a pledge of US$4.3 to support humanitarian services in Nigeria. However, the EU Institutions are the second largest development partners that have made commitment in support for humanitarian services in Nigeria. Other development partners that have made contributions and commitment includes Germany US$ 2.9 million, Sweden US$ 0.3 and 0.4 million, Switzerland US$ 0.3 million and Denmark US$ 0.05 million.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fund</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>People Targeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>US$ 17.8 million</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>US$ 58 million</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>2.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>US$ 254.4 million</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>4.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>US$ 0.03 million</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6.9 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 show that Nigeria required US$ 17.8 million which represent 19% to meet the needs of 8.3 million people. In 2015, Nigeria required US$ 58 million which represent 58% to meet the needs of 2.8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. In 2016, Nigeria required US$ 254.4 million which represent 52% to meet the needs of 4.7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and in 2017; Nigeria required US$ 0.03 million which represent 0% to meet the needs of 6.9 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.

CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS IN NORTHEASTERN NIGERIA

Despite the considerable success stories recorded by development partners in an attempt to address the humanitarian crises in the Northeastern part of Nigeria. Development partners have been faced with a number of challenges discussed above. However, these challenges are not without remedy especially
challenges that emanate from the development partners themselves. One of such challenges is the lack of harmonization of donors’ resources in supporting humanitarian services in the Northeastern region.

Moreover, the hitherto achievements can be made impactful if there is a joint donor fund where resources provided by donor agencies are set aside for the effective coordination and implementation of all donor programmes in the affected Northeastern states in Nigeria. Our argument here is that the lack of harmonization of donor funds has lead to the fragmentation of donor input and output supports, thereby making it difficult for a collective assessment of donors’ supports. To this end a well harmonized and coordinated resources will achieve more goals than a fragmented resources.

Thus, just like the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO) of the European Union that was established in 1992 and has the mandate to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the European Union. Development partners should provide similar platform for the purpose of addressing the humanitarian challenges in the Northeastern Nigeria.

The UN humanitarian reform process which started in 2005 and built on existing thinking on the use of pooled funding as a mechanism for Channeling humanitarian assistance may be used as a pool basket for Northeastern, Nigeria. Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) which replaced the previously existing Central Emergency Revolving Fund allows donor governments and the private sector to pool their financing on a global level to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance. Pooled mechanisms will be used by many donors as a way of ensuring their own aid spending is coordinated and able to respond to shifting priorities in a flexible and coherent way.

The Federal Government of Nigeria on the other hand has been faced with the challenges of resources and multiple pressing security problems. Besides, there are other problems in the country that have been distracting the focus of the government like the resurgent rebellion in the Niger Delta, separatist agitation in the south east, and recent clashes between pastoralists and farmers over land and water in Benue, Plateau, Ekiti, Kogi, Niger, Taraba, Kaduna state as well as a severe economic and budgetary crisis that have affect governance at all levels which in turn affected the National Emergency Management Agency capacity to manage a prolonged, large-scale humanitarian operation. The implication of this protracted state of Boko Haram insurgency is that the Federal and state governments in Nigeria are already overwhelmed by IDPs in Borno, Plateau, Adamawa, Yobe, Benue state, and the F.C.T-Abuja.

The state of insecurity in north-eastern part of Nigeria has restricted humanitarian access by development partners estimated at 34 per cent of the territory in Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe, where 41 per cent representing 7 million people are in need of various categories. Most of the 26 inaccessible LGAs are in Borno, where military operations against Boko Haram fighters have remain unabated. For example, in Borno state polio vaccination was not possible in 64 per cent of the state as at October 2015. Also, some IDPs have relocated to areas where humanitarian partners have not been able to provide the necessary assistance due to access constraints (Humanitarian Responses Plan, 2017).

Funding remains a key limiting factor in the humanitarian response to the increasing crisis in the northeastern Nigeria as a number of humanitarian organisations vying for limited resources, securing finance to cover all the humanitarian needs in Nigeria northeast has proven difficult. Also, many implementation development partners lack the capacity to work in the Northeastern region especially where the terrain is extremely challenging and where they do not enjoy the relative protection of security agencies as many development partners have heavily relied on the Nigerian security operatives for protection(Humanitarian Responses Plan, 2017).

Unwarranted delays in securing import permits and tax waivers by international humanitarian agencies has responsible for the slow pace of humanitarian response to Nigeria. Presently, there relief materials in Nigeria ports waiting for clearance while racking up demurrage costs; this not only raises the costs of response; it also delays the delivery of much-needed assistance to people in need. One of such challenges is the visa, waivers and clearances that slowdown or even impedes the response process.

The lack of a ‘humanitarian visa’ category for access into Nigeria has left humanitarian organizations with no option but to apply through the other available channels. The first few days/ weeks of declaring a humanitarian crisis in northeastern part of Nigeria is key to the effective resolution of that challenge and delays in the acquisition of visas by humanitarian workers have further compound the...
challenge, resulting in the loss of human lives. Thus, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) are required to register their presence and seek permission (duration) to carry out their activities. Currently, many of the INGOs in Nigeria are given temporary permits, which come with restrictions on how they can carry out their activities and a short duration. This becomes inefficient for the INGOs programmes as considerable time meant for the intervention on the field is spent getting administrative permits in the capital. In addition, the length of time to register an INGO, temporary or permanent, acts as a significant bottleneck to the swift administration of humanitarian relief (www.reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/north-east-nigeria-humanitarian-situation-update-january-2018).

CONCLUSION
Since the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Task Force in September 2016 and the creation of the Emergency Coordination Centre, an unprecedented scale-up of the humanitarian response is underway and has begun bearing fruit. An unprecedented upsurge in humanitarian operations Northeast that has made it possible for humanitarian actors to witnessed significant achievements, notably strengthened national leadership, the establishment of humanitarian hubs, expansion of operations, an increase in humanitarian activities in LGA’s Borno, Yobe and Adamawa state and the augmentation of inter-sector capacity. There is, however, much to be done and many significant challenges remain including entry visas, non-governmental organisation (NGO) registration, import permits and tax waivers, access, providing other items and services and last, but not least, the critical issue of funding. What we need to succeed in 2017 is sustained engagement and support from all humanitarian actors; improved communication at all levels; access facilitation; human resources and sufficient funding to cover the cost of implementing the Humanitarian Response Plan.

RECOMMENDATIONS
From the foregoing we make the following recommendations:

Firstly, a joint donor basket like the Joint Donor Basket (JDB) of the Democratic Governance for Development (DGD) Project should be established so as to allow for proper coordination of development partners support and enhance it effective implementation in order to achieve it desired impact.

Secondly, United Nations and international humanitarian NGOs need to engage the Nigerian government more proactively and improve their collaboration in responding to one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world today by mobilizing more international funding – currently grossly lacking – and make better use of international expertise.

Thirdly, to prevent the current humanitarian emergency from claiming more lives, prolonging the conflict and fuelling longer term insecurity in the region, the federal government must match its military campaign against Boko Haram with strong commitment to addressing the immediate humanitarian needs and longer-term development and reconstruction assistance to rebuild the north east. This will among other things includes granting access to and facilitating, independent local and international reporting and assessments. This is necessary not only for proper resource mobilisation, but even more importantly as a way to provide independent analysis of outstanding emergency relief requirements.

Moreover, measures are to be put in place by the Federal Ministry of Interior and other relevant agencies to fast track visas for humanitarian workers, temporary international NGO registration as well as waiver and clearance applications for relief items at Nigeria ports of entry.

However, the Federal Government should accelerate the implementation of its response, for instance in disbursing the 12 billion naira (about $41 million) which was announced, in May 2016, that would be used to rebuild the north east.

Finally, periodic visits by top government functionaries including President Buhari himself, to the camps and major communities hosting IDPs are essential to begin breaking down the suspicion faced by the newly displaced, and to affirm to them, as well as to state and government officials, that as Nigerian citizens and victims of the insurgency, they should not be left without food or medical assistance.
REFERENCES


Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), (2010a), Policy for Sweden’s Humanitarian Aid. UF2010/39010/SP
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), (2010b), Policy on Security and Development in Swedish Development Cooperation, UF/2010/38380/SP
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), (2004), The Government’s Humanitarian Aid Policy, Comm. 2004/05:52
www.fews.net/west-africa/nigeria/key-message-update/january-2018accessed16/03/2018: 01:58pm
www.guardian.ng/news/fg-unfolds-n92-2-billion-marshall-plan-for-n-east/accessed15/03/2018: 12:22pm
www.icirmigeria.org/aid-agencies-avert-humanitarian-tragedy-north-east/accessed 17/03/2018:04:36pm
www.icirmigeria.org/aid-agencies-avert-humanitarian-tragedy-north-east/accessed 17/03/2018:04:36pm
www.reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-facts-figures-2017 accessed 10/03/2018:01:01pm
www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/dms/HC%20Statement%20on%20Rann%20attack%202%20March%202018%20280229.pdf accessed 25/03/2018:04:36pm
www.usaid.gov/nigeria/food-assistance accessed 21/03/2018:03:36pm
www.usaid.gov/nigeria/food-assistance accessed 26/03/2018:04:30pm