

EMPOWERING COMMUNITY SECURITY OPERATIVES FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Terrorism in Nigeria has posed huge insecurity and countering it is majorly managed by the government which should not be so. There is a need to expand the strategy for countering terrorism to include the local and traditional security operatives for sustainability of the program. It is important that traditional security structure be mainstreamed into the government security structure as it will only make the counter terrorism sustainable, it will be easy for be owed by the communities which will institutionalize the program.

Introduction: Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Danjibo (2009) records that the initial response of the Nigerian government to Boko Haram crisis was that of trivialization as President Yar'Adua chose to go to Brazil while a large section of the country was on fire. On his return, embarrassed by the "Boko Haram" violence, the President set up a Commission of Inquiry headed by the National Security Adviser to the President, retired General Abdul Sarki Mukhtar, with a mandate to look into the crisis, but most importantly, to look into the circumstances of the death of Yusuf and other leaders of the sect. Like most other Commissions of Inquiry, it did not lead to any meaningful outcome.

But when the government decided to intervene, it adopted a crude response of force used to justify it by saying that the sectarian movement wanted to depose the government of President Yar'Adua. *Newswatch* magazine reported that the security forces, especially the Nigeria Army and the Nigeria Police were engaged in reckless killings of members of the sect, as an eye witness recounted to *Newswatch*: "They are killing these people like chickens", obviously referring to the indiscriminate manner by which members of the sect were being killed by Nigerian security forces. The Amnesty International Report (2009) describes how the Nigerian Police Force is responsible for hundreds of extra-judicial killings and disappearances each year across the country that largely "go uninvestigated and unpunished." (Forrest 2012:91) An example is the brutal killing of the original leader Mohammed Yusuf and other members. Human Rights Watch recorded that after Boko Haram militants attacked an army patrol in Maiduguri with explosives and gunfire on 9 July 2011, injuring two soldiers, locals reported that the army began burning homes and shooting unarmed civilians. United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks news service reported that

Soldiers began shooting in the air...breaking into homes, singling out male occupants and shooting them, and driving women out of the houses which they set ablaze. (Forest 2012:91)

According to Omotola (2010), the African leaders' counter terrorism strategies are full of controversies following human rights abuses. He argues that the strategies adopted for countering terrorism could constitute a threat to human rights and national security. The expansion poses dangers to human rights,

essentially because they create room for governments to enact counter-terrorism legislation whose latitude of power may be unlimited - powers of arrest, detention, prosecution, denial of bail, and so on. Even though national security, a cornerstone in a country's national interest, is usually advanced as the reason for heightening the war against terrorism, unfortunately, the military-like fashion in which the war against terror has been fought has compromised and complicated the security situation.

As people's rights are flagrantly violated in the course of prosecuting the war, new sources of security threats develop. People will respond to the violation of their rights in some way, most likely in a violent manner, especially when they have explored available sources of local remedy without respite. While terrorism leads to the severe violation of people's civil liberties and state and societal security, the management of terrorism has the potential to degenerate into further human rights and security threats. This is particularly so when counter-terrorism measures adopt the ongoing excessively militarised direction championed by the US in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. (Omotola 2010: 43)

However, in 2011, the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011 was enacted. According to Oyeboade (2011), one of the motivations for the enactment of the statute was the necessity to implement Nigeria's treaty obligations on terrorism and matters related thereto. The relevant counter-terrorism Conventions include the following:

- (a) Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1973;
- (b) International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979;
- (c) Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, 1997;
- (d) Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999;
- (e) Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 1970;
- (f) Convention for the Suppression the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970;
- (g) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971;
- (h) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 1988;
- (i) Convention on the Making of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification, 1991;
- (j) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988;
- (k) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988;
- (l) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980.

Furthermore, the Act seeks to provide for measures for the prevention, prohibition and combating of acts of terrorism, the financing of terrorism in Nigeria and prescribes penalties for violating any of its provisions. Accordingly, the Act contains 41 sections, arranged into Eight Parts with a Schedule, listing relevant statutes. Part I defines acts of terrorism and related offences while Part II contains provisions relating to terrorist funds and property. Part III is on mutual assistance and extradition and Part IV is on information sharing on criminal matters. Parts V and VI set out investigative and prosecution processes respectively, while Part VII deals with charities and the last Part contains miscellaneous provisions. (Oyeboade 2011). The Act has been amended by the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013.

It is to be emphasized that government response to the threats posed by the Boko Haram sect are largely military in nature, and this could be based on several possible reasons. First, the Terrorist Prevention Act itself according to Oyeboade was primarily in fulfillment of Nigeria's counter terrorism efforts, thus it is

possible that the bill was hurriedly drafted and signed without due attention to the peculiar conditions of the Nigerian society or the process of implementation and even oversight. Thus according to Oyeboode (2011), trials of a number of cases involving terrorism have not disclosed full regard for procedural safeguards such as presumption of innocence, right to counsel, fair hearing, etc which are the hallmarks of modern criminal jurisprudence. There is considerable misgiving in certain quarters regarding treatment meted out to detainees accused of terrorist acts, some of whom have since died in incarceration. Another possible reason why the military dominated strategy might be in play is because the government is attempting to save face and demonstrate that funds allocated to it are in use because huge investments have been given to defense budget over many years.

According to the former Minister of Finance, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, President Jonathan signed Nigeria's 2014 budget of N4.962 trillion and Defence got N968.127 billion representing 20% of the total budget because of the growing insecurity situation in the country. Premium Times (March 2014) Records of Nigeria's Military Spending from 2001 to 2010 are presented below:

Table 3.7. Records of Nigeria's Military Spending from 2001 to 2010

Year	Dollars Spent	% GDP
2001	\$1,281,000,000	1.3%
2002	\$1,933,000,000	1.5%
2003	\$1,190,000,000	0.9%
2004	\$1,159,000,000	0.7%
2005	\$1,024,000,000	0.6%
2006	\$1,067,000,000	0.5%
2007	\$1,239,000,000	0.6%
2008	\$1,741,000,000	0.8%
2009	\$1,825,000,000	0.9%
2010	\$2,143,000,000	1.0%

Source: MilitaryBudget.org

One may also point to the intensity of the conflict situation, which can be seen in the sophistication of arms used by the members of the group, increasing geographical spread of the conflict, rising number of casualties and number of persons drawn into conflict on both sides. It must be said that from 75 deaths on both sides in 2010, 154 persons in 2011, 454 in 2012, the number of deaths on both sides in 2013 have exploded to a shocking sum of 1638 deaths in the first half of the year alone!(AIT, Big Story 15th May 2013)

Forest (2012) records that the Nigerian government's response to Boko Haram is primarily a show of force. There are routine police searches, Nigeria's military forces have been deployed on multiple occasions to find and apprehend members of the group, search and seize weapons used by the terrorists, enforce curfews, and other counterterrorism missions. However, it can be said that Nigeria's leaders are learning that successfully confronting the threat of Boko Haram will require more than a traditional kill/capture counterterrorism strategy.

Even the Governor of Borno State "admitted that the army has been guilty of excesses during operations to counter Boko Haram." (Forest 2012:92). According to BBC News, on 12 July 2011, a group of 18 local members of the respected Borno Elders Forum called for the withdrawal of troops from the city,

saying the soldiers had worsened the security situation, and negatively affected the relationship between Nigeria's security forces and the community members they are ostensibly there to protect.

Forest also argued that a whole-of-government approach is necessary for successfully defeating a terrorist group, and for that of Boko Haram, a "whole of Nigeria approach" in which government forces and nongovernmental entities are engaged in a complementary effort, in some cases with the support and assistance of the U.S. and the international community. According to him, success will come from working together to understand all we can about Boko Haram and the environment that has sustained them, and then craft a strategy that employs this knowledge to maximum benefit. So,

...Boko Haram is an enemy of moderation and stability; they have chosen to promote a violent ideology shrouded in religious language, and portray themselves as a vanguard of an epic struggle between good and evil. As such, they cannot be bombed into submission, nor can all Boko Haram members and sympathizers be identified and captured or killed. Just like many other religious terrorist groups around the world, the eventual demise of Boko Haram will come through a combination of kinetic force, law enforcement, local intelligence, and diminishing the local resonance of the group's ideology. (Forest 2012:90)

According to Forest (2012), significant reforms are needed in many areas, including the legal sector, and this is one of the reasons why many Muslims appeal for Sharia law, as they argue that the secular laws seem to be serving the elites of Nigeria only. Corruption is making it easy for the wealthy and connected to be able to get away with virtually any kind of injustice. For example, John Campbell notes, Boko Haram's ideology

...draws on a long-standing local tradition of Islamic radical reform that emphasizes the pursuit of justice for the poor through the imposition of Sharia. Adherents generally despise Nigeria's secular leadership and the country's traditional Muslim elites, whom they see as having been co-opted by the government. (Forest 2012:87)

Forest further argued that the government must know that inequitable application of the rule of law exacerbates an already deeply problematic system of ethnic identity politics, which detracts from any significant sense of national unity or shared journey. Also, the government must also address the myriad socioeconomic demands like poverty, health and educational services, unemployment, infrastructure, and so forth, because there is a link between these many kinds of grievances and the rise of violent extremism is particularly prominent in the north, where the people have higher poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, health problems, and overall insecurity than elsewhere in Nigeria. What is interesting with this line of thought is that this view that proposes beyond military force as a strategy for security was highlighted in the September 2011 report by the Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the North-East Zone, which noted the need to address issues of governance and the delivery of services to people.

At the international environment, Nigeria must collaborate with others to combat regional and global trafficking networks that could be used to help finance terrorist groups in their country, as captured in the Congressional testimony of Jennifer Cooke, Director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in which she says:

The Nigerian government's response to Boko Haram will need to be integrated into a comprehensive political, economic, and security strategy that offers some promise of real improvement

to northern populations and communities and limits the appeal of Boko Haram and its potential successors. (Forest 2012: 88)

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Reviewing the escalation of the Boko Haram attacks and the negative impacts, confronting it will require more than a traditional kill/capture counterterrorism strategy. After all, the government has already attempted a basic organizational decapitation approach—in which it is assumed that capturing and/or killing the leaders will cause the group to disintegrate—but following the public execution of Boko Haram’s leaders and financiers, the problem has only gotten worse.

It may be said that following the intensity of the Boko Haram attacks, the strategy now being adopted by the President Goodluck Jonathan administration is a fish and hunt strategy aimed at using the State’s military and intelligence capabilities to put an end to terrorism in the country. Thus according to the Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan:

Previously, we adopted a multi-track approach to the resolution of this problem through actions which included persuasion, dialogue and widespread consultation with the political, religious and community leaders in the affected states. We exercised restraint to allow for all efforts by both State Governors and well-meaning Nigerians to stop the repeated cases of mindless violence... those insurgents and terrorists who take delight in killing our security operatives, whoever they may be, wherever they may go, we will hunt them down, we will fish them out, and we will bring them to justice. No matter what it takes, we will win this war against terror. (Punch Newspapers, March 15, 2013)

But it is important to note the significant progress made by the military shortly before the 2015 March general elections. In February of 2015 more than 300 Boko Haram fighters were killed by Nigerian forces as eleven more towns were recaptured and various weapon stockpiles were seized or destroyed, and additional insurgents were arrested. In March 2015 a fresh offensive against Boko Haram by a coalition of Chadian, Cameroonian, and Nigerian forces leading to the Nigerian army recapturing Bama.

However this is not to say that the response of the Nigerian government is purely military as it has non-military plans enshrined in the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) based on the following overriding five principles of Effectiveness, Proportion, Transparency, Flexibility, and Collaboration. The planned response to terrorist threats are based on the five Ps – **P**revention of terrorist attacks, **P**rotection of the public and key national services from attacks, **P**ursue terrorist and sponsors to obtain justice, **P**repare the nation to manage and minimize the consequences of terrorist attacks and **P**rogram implementation to include crime registering, border management, vehicle registration, de-radicalization and challenging the terrorists ideology. (NACTEST 2011).

Murdock (2014) reported that Nigeria government has launched a new strategy 'Soft Approach' aimed at tackling insurgency in the North East Nigeria, it is very much at the early stage and the program is yet to take off. For the government to announce the 'Soft Approach' in March of 2014 after five years of countering the insurgency via military strategy further support the researcher's position that there is a need to effectively explore alternative strategies beyond military force, to counter terrorism because it is not enough.

Some of the programs planned by the government under the strategic security plan include the following: the Safe School Initiative (SSI), the Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE), and Nigeria's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program. Under the *Safe Schools Initiative (SSI)*, government has both short and long term plans. The short term plan is to accelerate the enrolment of displaced children in schools in their host communities and secure places in schools for children in IDP camps, while the long term plan is to secure communities as soon as they are rid of the terrorists so that citizens can return safely and children go back to school in their community. However, if need be, children living in Local Government Areas at high risk of insurgent activities could be transferred to secondary schools in safer locations. Apart from the SSI program, Almajiri schools that have been established by the government. According to President Jonathan:

... I met excited young children. These are bright, lively children, now receiving the best Nigeria can offer. With public funds, the next generation now has the tools it needs to make for themselves better lives and to make this a better country. I know very well what education means. Education is the key to transformation. My dream is that one day, a product of Almajiri schools will become President of this great nation. (March 25 2015, The Guardian newspaper)

Under the *Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE)*, government is addressing immediate human suffering by empowering response agencies to better deliver much needed humanitarian relief – food, non-food items, and medicines to victims of Boko Haram. The government also have inaugurated the North East Economic Transformation (NEET) which has embarked on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the North East so that the region could be rebuilt and experience economic renaissance. The nation will leverage the region's strategic agricultural and solid mineral assets to create jobs and expand economic opportunities for the youths, and ensure long-term peace and prosperity.

While under the Nigeria's CVE program, government is focusing de-radicalization and reintegration of suspected and convicted extremist offenders back into the society which is been managed by the State Security Services (SSS). The program involves the development and implementation of an after care program for the de-radicalized involving community reintegration and rehabilitation. However, it is important to note that much of the non-military strategies are at the planning stage and actual implementation is at early stage.

After reviewing the governments non-military plans which are still at the planning stage and are yet to take off in an election year, one is tempted to conclude that they are political talks aimed at winning votes. The researcher argues that counter-terrorism program must be creative in developing strategies that will go beyond military approach, as military strategy is not solving the problem. Meaningful response to terrorism must address the structural causes which include

socio-economic and political conditions of the country. The article argues that there is a need explore the role of non-military strategies in countering the phenomenon of terrorism, which is a global problem today. The government's counter-terrorism approaches must be creative in developing strategies that will go beyond just killing or military approach, as it is not solving the problem. Meaningful response to counter terrorism program must address the structural causes which include socio-economic and political conditions of the country. For example, the United Nations proposals to addressing some of the terrorism promoting environments which include human rights violation, poor governance and economic mismanagement are worthy of consideration because they will be of great benefit to safety.

Theoretical Framework: Community Partnerships Theory

The theory adopted for the study is the Partnership Theory, Rosenbaum (2002) which has argued over many years, that the criminal justice system cannot, by itself, solve the complex problems of crime, drugs, and disorder in our society. According to him, given the multiple and complex causes of crime, a growing number of scholars argue that a new approach is needed, one that tackles these problems from multiple angles, applying a multitude of strategies. Multiple interventions are considered more effective than single interventions because they hold the potential of increasing the total quantity (dosage) and/or quality of the "treatment" as representing different organizational cultures and services bring more "new" ideas and resources to the problem-solving arena.

Scholars like Butterfoss et al., 1993; Connell, J. P. et al., 1995) have argued that functions of Partnerships include (1) increase organizational accountability; (2) reduce fragmentation and duplication of services; (3) build public-private linkages; (4) increase public awareness of (and participation in) anti-crime initiatives; (5) strengthen local community organizations; and (6) permanently alter the way agencies "do business" by giving more attention to strategic planning, data-driven decision making, prevention, interagency cooperation, and community participation in local governance.

Incorporating Community Security Operatives with Government Security Apparatus

In the same vein, there is a strong need to expand the counter-terrorism strategy to incorporate the community and CSOs security structures in combating terrorism in Nigeria. Research findings reveal that CSOs and community members can help significantly in mobilising for resolution through information or intelligence gathering. According to the findings, Boko Haram members are residents of the communities, and there is no way people cannot hear them plan their attacks. So, if there is a coordinated structure for information gathering without endangering the lives of the individuals, information will flow that can help nip the attack in the bud.

One particular respondent talked about the Azare community in Bauchi State where the CSOs are so actively involved until it is not easy for Boko Haram terrorist to function in that state. He narrated the terrorist attack of December 2012, when gunmen stormed the community and killed six people, then the religious and community leaders encouraged the youths to chase and arrest anyone with arms and ammunitions. These words of encouragement and support from the leaders made hundreds of the youths of the community to pursue the terrorists, rounded them up, disarmed them and killed them. With this development, the community and CSOs are working together with the police to make their communities unsafe for Boko Haram operations and there is hardly any news of terrorist attacks in the state.

Communities and its security operatives constitute an important part of sustenance. Grass root democracies and development agencies have been found to hold the secret of sustainability, and it will not be different in preventing or managing terrorism. Development agencies have always trusted the role of grassroots programs and have worked with them to get things done, even, in prevention of conflicts and peace building. Therefore, getting them to come on board for countering Boko Haram is acceptable.

According to Briggs (2010), community engagement in counterterrorism in UK since 2001 have thwarted many terrorists' attacks between 2001 and 2008, and over 200 individuals were successfully prosecuted for planning, supporting or inciting terrorism. She identified four ways in which well integrated

communities can contribute towards an effective counterterrorism strategy - act as an early warning system for the police and intelligence services; prevent young people from becoming radicalized towards violence; tackle the grievances—real and perceived—that allow terrorists’ messages to resonate more widely, either among those who might be swayed to commit, support or incite terrorism, or among those in whose name terrorists purport to act; And the principle of policing through consent is as relevant to counterterrorism as to any other area of law enforcement.

So, is the case of the civilian JTF (the vigilante youth group) that is known to have recorded success in identifying and leaking information on the hideouts of the Boko Haram members to the soldiers. For example *Daily Times Nigeria* on the 14th June 2014 reported an incident:

The displaced Gwoza man was being driven in a commercial tricycle (Keke Napep) when he sighted the suspected killer of his brother who died during an attack on their community in Gwoza local government. He immediately jumped out of the Keke-Napep and held the suspect with whom he began to wrestle. We never knew what was happening until the man began to shout ‘this is Boko Haram man that killed my brother in Gwoza, please come and help me catch him. He was the one that shot my brother.’ That was how members of the civilian-JTF gathered and arrested the man whom they later handed over to soldiers nearby,” said an eyewitness, who said his name should not be mentioned.

The activities of the Civilian JTF makes them the most hated group by the Boko Haram sect as was captured by Odeleye (2014)

When Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram releases his video messages these days, the people who have begun to attract more hate and bile than any other are the vigilante groups in the North that have mobilized themselves to defend their communities and fight Boko Haram. This group of people, mostly untrained and outnumbered have recorded some astounding victories against the sect even though some have lost their lives in the process.


Scholars like Forest (2012), Fisher (2011) and Benjamin (2008) argued strongly for the government security operatives and the community organizations and leaderships to work together for sustainable peace. It will be dangerously misleading not to include the traditional community security apparatus in the security structures that can counter Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

These findings have shown that communities’ participation in securing their communities from violent conflicts or insecurities is mandatory if sustainable peace would be achieved. This study has contributed to the discussion of community and CSOs contribution to managing the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Every traditional society in Nigeria has a security structure which protects the communities, so is the communities attacked by the terrorist sect. According to the different scholars, communities hold the key to stopping the terrorists’ attacks as they familiar with the terrain and can stop any person or act which they find a threat to peace. But, what can be a challenge to the effectiveness of these security outfits is the lack of a formal process which can guide their involvement. However, the below diagram can explain the process of communication for effective result.

Community/Civil Society Contribution

	Major Issues of Investigation	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	I strongly think that Nigerian government should get the input of civil society organizations in the counter terrorism program.	210 (56%)	126 (33.6%)	32 (8.5%)	7 (1.9%)
	I think there is a need to civilian input especially in intelligence gathering.	243 (64.8%)	108 (28.8%)	20 (5.3%)	4 (1.1%)



Analysing the responses of the respondents, it is obvious that they agreed that the community and CSOs have roles to play in combating terrorism in Nigeria. 336 (90%) of the responses to question 14 agreed that CSOs can help significantly in mobilising for resolution. Also, in question 15 which is similar to question 14, 351 (92%) agreed that the community members can help immensely in information or intelligence gathering.

All the respondents interviewed argued strongly that members of Boko Haram are residents of the communities, and there is no way people cannot hear them plan their attacks. Although they acknowledge that there were foreigners fighting alongside the Nigerian members who actively participated in most of the attacks. Some of the fighters are doctors, professionals and artisans and are from Chad, Niger and Cameroon. So, if there is a coordinated structure for information gathering without endangering the lives of the individuals, information will flow that can help nip the attack in the bud.

One particular respondent who was interviewed in Abuja on the 25th of February 2014 talked about the Azare community in Bauchi State where the CSOs are so actively involved until it is not easy for Boko Haram terrorist to function in that state. He narrated the terrorist attack of December 2012, when gunmen stormed the community and killed six people, then the religious and community leaders encouraged the youths to chase and arrest anyone with arms and ammunitions. These words of encouragement and support from the leaders made hundreds of the youths of the community to pursue the terrorists, rounded them up, disarmed them and killed them. With this development, the community and CSOs are working together with the police to make their communities unsafe for Boko Haram operations and there is hardly any news of terrorist attacks in the state.

A respondent interviewed in Lagos 30th of July 2014 also complained of the absence of community leaders in the management of the situation. They are of the view that there should be strong involvement of

the communities in the counterterrorism program. They argued that the members of the Boko Haram sect are known members of the community and if the community rise up to the challenge like the people of Azare community in Bauchi, the insurgency will stop.

A respondent at the Luxury Bus Garage at Sabon-gari, Kano State argued strongly for community involvement in resolving the problem. He lamented the destruction of community live in Kano because of the insurgency, and blamed the community leaders, including the politicians for paying lip services to issues of concern to the community, from unemployment, to failing businesses and the present terrorist attacks.

In the same vein, two residents of Kano interviewed on the 24th of July 2014, on Dambata Street, Kano were of the view that there should be community involvement as these people are known to the community members and if there is a program that can guarantee them safety, they can play constructive role to end the insurgency. Mustapha explained the role his NGO and others are playing to address the problem of Boko Haram by organizing rallies and programs to address the problem. He gave an example of the youth rally that was organized to stop the numbering of northerners in the South East which is leading to stigmatization of all northerners as terrorists.

Discussion of Research Findings

Communities and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) constitute an important part of sustenance. Grass root democracies and development agencies have been found to hold the secret of sustainability, and it will not be different in preventing or managing terrorism. Development agencies have always trusted the role of CBOs and CSOs and have worked with them to get things done, even, prevention of conflicts and peace building. Therefore, getting them to come on board for countering Boko Haram is acceptable.

According to Briggs (2010), community engagement in counterterrorism in UK since 2001 have thwarted many terrorists' attacks between 2001 and 2008, and over 200 individuals were successfully prosecuted for planning, supporting or inciting terrorism. She identified four ways in which well integrated communities can contribute towards an effective counterterrorism strategy - act as an early warning system for the police and intelligence services; prevent young people from becoming radicalized towards violence; tackle the grievances—real and perceived—that allow terrorists' messages to resonate more widely, either among those who might be swayed to commit, support or incite terrorism, or among those in whose name terrorists purport to act; And the principle of policing through consent is as relevant to counterterrorism as to any other area of law enforcement.

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
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Referring to the literature reviews done earlier, these findings are corroborating the studies and findings of Forest (2012), Fisher (2011) and Benjamin (2008) who argued strongly for the government security operatives and the community organizations and leaderships to work together for sustainable peace. It will be dangerously misleading not to include the CSOs and the community members in the development of the security structures that can counter Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

These findings have shown that communities' participation in securing their communities from violent conflicts or insecurities is mandatory if sustainable peace would be achieved. This study has contributed to the discussion of community and CSOs contribution to managing the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Diagram of Community Security Operative Structure for Countering Boko Haram

The communication process requires that the community security groups will send information on security to the Communication Hub/Centre via phones, emails, and any other way possible. The Communication will then analyse the data sent in and send information on what is to be done to the communities, government offices and any other relevant stakeholders.



SS: Security Sector

Relevant Organizations: NGOs and CBOs,

Communication Hub: Government Agency

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