CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT IN THE AFRICAN STATES: A STUDY OF LIBYAN CRISIS

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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the causes and consequences of conflicts in Africa as a continent over the past decades. It focuses specifically on the crisis in Libya by revealing essential facts about the conflict. The objectives of the study were: to assess the impact of civil wars and interstate conflict on development, the effect of civil wars, and inter-state conflict on internal and regional stability. The study is a qualitative one in which data were sourced mainly from secondary sources such as journal articles, books, and reports. The theory of relative deprivation was adopted to explain how collective dissatisfaction results in political violence, as seen in Libya’s case. Anger, which was created by frustration, is a motivating instrument that has inclined men to aggression. The study’s findings show that the root causes of the Libya crisis are: Arab spring revolution, which spread through North Africa, weak national identity, and intervention of powerful nations. Furthermore, the Libya crisis consequences include death and displacement of civilians; Abuse of the Responsibility to Protect, Regional instability, Libyan election; economy; discrimination; human rights abuse. It was, therefore, among others, recommended that: sit-tight syndrome should be discouraged among African leaders; National conferences that encourage talks on how to resolve colonial issues should be promoted in African nations; Africa leaders need to look inward in finding solutions to African problems rather than looking for disruptive external solutions.

Keywords: Conflict, Civil war, Democracy, Arms proliferation

Background of Conflicts in Africa
Africa is laced with some of the most obstinate conflicts (Odukoya, 2016). The popular depiction of Africa is that armed conflict is widespread throughout the continent. The conflict in Africa increased during the decolonization period. From the mid-1950 through early1980 (Marshall, 2006). In the period stated above, Africans had experienced 19 civil wars, 11 genocides, and various interstate and inter-border conflicts. Some of these conflicts occurred in countries such as include Civil war in Chad (1965-85), civil war in Nigeria (1967-70), Civil war in Angola in 1974, Eritrea/Ethiopian crisis between 1962 and 1979, Algeria- Morocco conflict over the Atlas Mountains area in October 1963, Nigeria/Cameroon dispute over the Bakassi Peninsular which started in the 1970 and ended with ICJ verdict in 2003, Ethiopia/Somalia dispute of 1964 to 1978 over the Ugandan desert region, Chad/Libya crisis of 1980- 1982, Kenya/Somalia border war of 1963 -1967, Tanzania/Uganda crisis in 1978-79 (Aremu, 2010 and Nass, 2012).

In the late 1980s, there was a steady increase in Africa conflicts, many of which peaked in 2005. The main reason why the conflict endured for so long was the prolonged duration of wars during the Cold War era. (Marshall, 2006). Examples of the war during this period include; Liberia (1980- 2003), Rwanda and Sierra Leone (1991-2001), Sudan (1995-2003), Somalia (1991-93), Burundi (1993-2005), Central African Republic (2006), Comoros (1995-99), Congo (2000), Cote D'Ivoire (2002-2005), Democratic Republic of

By 2007, there had been a remarkable decline in the outbreak of conflicts in the continent. The number of conflicts recorded in Africa had decreased to twelve (12), spread across ten (10) countries (Eaton, 2017). The event of a conflict in Africa was prominent in Libya, South Sudan, Somalia, and Nigeria, which made up 33% of violent conflicts that happened across Africa in 2016; this total shows a decrease in conflict from 35% in 2015 and 40% in 2014. The conflicts in these four countries remain to date. Although Somalia remains the most active, followed by South Sudan, Libya, then Nigeria. (Conflict Trend, 2017).

According to Nass (2012), these conflicts have resulted in a large scale of death and property loss. UNICEF reported 850,000 children died between 1980-1988 due to only two of Africa's major wars in Angola and Mozambique. These conflicts are related to regime formation, economic crisis, tribal or ethnic factors (Arraf, 2017).

African conflicts usually arise from boundary disputes (Nnamani and Onuigbo, 2012). However, the present external factor in African conflicts should not be underestimated. Most of these conflicts, such as civil wars, post-election violence, and border disputes, have their roots in the colonial past of the countries. In contrast, armed conflicts usually involve the intervention of two superpowers and other African, Arab, and Latin American allies. These external forces (superpowers) have created rebellion, discord, and wars in Africa, which according to Matthews (1999), have taken the following forms; sponsored coup d'etat, creation and supporting opposition groups, economic sanctions, and press war designed to undermine the legitimacy of the regime, the isolated or combined use of neighboring states, mercenaries, and direct military intervention to destabilize the regime. Patrice Lumumba's government in Congo (Zaire) was one of the earliest victims of such attempts (Arraf, 2017). Other examples include; Nkrumah of Ghana (1996), Obote of Uganda (1971), Sekon Toure of Guinea (1970), Mathieu Kerekou of Benin (1977), Albert Reneof Seychelles (1981), and Maummar Gaddafi of Libya (2011) (Arraf, 2017).

Other than the formulation and overthrowing of administrations, the 1980s observed the emergence of economic factors, assuming a more prominent role in creating the crisis (Bakken, and Siri, 2018). Africa's political economy has dependably been delicate, which has prompted them to be exploited. The likelihood of African conflict is expanding in nature. The continent's poor economic growth rate, prompting lacking assets to redistribute and evident disparity in the international system, is sufficient motivation to aggravate enmity. In the mid-1980s, there were alerts of an approaching development crisis. The African government's failure to react to the worldwide economic crisis expanded disparities among Africa and the rest of the world. Every economic pointer indicated the glaring level of poverty in the continent and the development of multilateral organizations, which further emphasized economic inequality in most of the third world has not saved Africa (Pedden, 2017).

While regime formation or collapse and economic crisis could be said to be products of colonialism, the same may not be entirely applicable to the factor of ethnicity, which has always been a prominent feature in African society and politics and which has recently erupted with renewed fervor (Bakken and Siri 2018). The consequence of imperialism and colonialism stereotypes plays an important role along with diverse variables like class, ethnicity, and race in state consolidation and conflict (Maloka, 2001).

**Conceptual Clarification**

The conceptualization of conflict is dynamic and constantly evolving, especially in the post-Cold War era, where the world has experienced a shift in the form of conflict from interstate to intrastate conflicts. This shift has influenced the definition of the term 'conflict.'

To Nnamani and Onuigbo (2012), conflict can be defined as the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by different persons or groups. On the other hand, armed conflict is the use of force and violence in the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals. Conflict is frustration or protest based on a lack of opportunity for development or recognition. Coser (1998) states that “conflict is a struggle over values and claims to status, power, and resources in which the conflicting parties aim to injure or eliminate their rivals.”
Omotosho (2004) views conflict as a violent or uncontrollable, dominant or recessive, resolvable, phenomenon. This presupposes that violence is not an inherent aspect of conflict but rather a potential form that conflict may take. ECOWAS defined conflict as 'contradictions inherent in power relations and which manifest themselves in individual and group interactions with one another and with nature in the pursuit of limited resources or opportunities' (ECPF 2008 cited in Annan, 2014). From the preceding views, conflict can be seen as a disagreement between individuals or groups over scarce resources. When parties do not follow the resolution mechanisms, things degenerate into violence, leading to injuries and loss of lives and properties.

Theoretical framework
The most suitable theory for explaining the root causes of the Libyan crisis is the relative deprivation theory. This section of the study reviews some of the scholarly literature on it (Kieh, 2008).

The relative deprivation theory gives a psychological approach to elaborate on how collective dissatisfaction is manifested as political violence by providing an aggression-frustration mechanism. The anger which was created by frustration is a motivating instrument that inclined men to aggression (Kieh, 2008). Aggression is always the result of frustration among people. Gurr (1989) elaborates that a higher degree of frustration leads to greater political instability in a country. By applying relative deprivation theory in explaining the Arab Spring situation in the Middle East and North Africa, which spread to Libya, led to the fall of the Muammar Gaddafi’s military government, Libyans were dissatisfied with decades of dictatorship. They were tired of their lack of freedom to choose who governs them. They felt deprived of their human rights by Gaddafi’s junta. Hence, their willingness to join the Arab spring wave that brought down Gaddafi Ghadafi’s government with the hope of getting a democratically elected government as a replacement.

Conflict in Libya
The progressing Libya conflict is portrayed through a set of armed groups and other parties who had different national, cultural, philosophical, and territorial (Arraf, 2017). The conflict was seen as a contest between patriot and Islam’s different conception of how things should be in Libya. They viewed various factors that included regional tensions between the country’s historical provinces, tribal and ethnic tensions, which in some cases date back to the prejudicial strategy followed during Gadafi’s regime, and conflicts between revolutionary forces and actors of the old regime (Arraf, 2017). Moreover, armed groups are strongly rooted in their local setting, which means that ideological and political agendas intersect with local identities as well as developing rivalry over assets in the nation, these clashing loyalties and personalities have additionally increased with outfitted gatherings competing for a stake in Libya’s future (Pedde, 2017).

According to Arraf (2017), the present proliferation of armed groups in Libya is a result of the 2011 Arab uprising, which prompted the collapse of the Gadafi regime. The vicious suppression of the previous regime on protestors prompted the local Council’s start and armed group in each city. Also, the National Transnational Council was set up in February 2011 by individuals from the banished restriction and high-positioning turncoats, to go about as the military authority of the uprising and the political delegate of the Libyan resistance. While the National Transnational Council increased wide acknowledgment from the international system in the long run, it neglected to construct close relations with armed groups and local Council causing the uprising (Eaton, 2017). All the more imperatively, the National Transitional Council did not prevail with regards to incapacitating these armed groups or consolidating them successfully into the state security device, which had for the most part fell after the fall of the Gadafi regime. As a result of a confusing procedure of cooperation, many armed groups that were put on the legislature’s finance held a high level of independence from the state (Arraf, 2017). In August 2012, the National Transitional Council power was transferred to the General National Council. Nonetheless, none of the successive governments that rose out of the Council figured out how to stop state financing for these armed groups or bring them justice, and the number of persons on the administration’s finance was recorded to be around 200,000 toward the start of 2014 (Bakken and Siri, 2018). At that point, many armed groups had reinforced their power, and some political parties and figures had adjusted themselves to specific armed groups. Therefore, the armed group came to control authority over laws by the parliament and state institutions, thereby blocking the
The prevalent effect of the Arab Spring started in early 2011. The ideology of The Arab Awakening/Arab Spring was a progressive clearing tide of demonstrations, challenges, and different types of restriction to the authorities (both vicious and peaceful), revolt, and extended civil wars in the Arab domains which began on December 18, 2010 (Bakken and Siri, 2018). The Arabs Spring of 2011 had diverse ramifications for nations that participated in it. In a few nations, occasions of the Arab Spring prompted a routine change with a move to either a more liberal routine, as it was in Tunisia, or with a move to simply non-democratic based routine such as in Egypt. The most deplorable outcome of the Arab Spring prompted
a civil war. This was the situation for Libya. The law was made by and for those who control power. There was an unequal distribution of wealth, nepotism, corruption, and the youth's struggle to transform that situation was the main aim for the Arab Spring and revolution, which eventually triggered the civil war (Salam, 2015).

Gaddafì strongly denounced the Arab Spring as they drew near to Libya. In fact, he referred to his 1973 statement on rebels as “stray dogs” to describe challengers in Benghazi as rats and cockroaches to be exterminated (Arraf, 2017). Gaddafì declined to surrender as the protest increased. Instead, he adopted the defense mechanism and remained in power. This defense method did not change course as he rejected the United Nations sanction of his action, repudiated the violation of human rights, and sent soldiers to destroy the rebels. After the death of Gaddafì, his son denied the legitimacy of the National Transitional Commission (Salam, 2015).

Even though the National Transitional Council reacted in a bloody way to supporter troops who rallied around Gaddafì because of his tradition of preference, its cruel reaction was preceded by Gaddafì's rebellious and vicious overwhelming talk (Easton, 2017). In this way, Gaddafì's suppression, disengagement from the real world, and reluctance to change increased the Libyan people's complaints and activated the reaction of repressive and faithful assaults. The collapse of the regime led to criticisms of the uprisings as the nation was thrown into turmoil are yet to recover from the civil war created by the power vacuum left after Gaddafì's demise and after that went about as the proximate reason for National Transitional Council militarization by expanding its stage quality. Cruel reactions both induced clash and pulled in bigger prevalent help, augmenting rebellions into Gaddafì's fierce dismissal with no probability of bargain. Regime radicalism along these lines paved the grisly idea of contention by constraining the National Transitional Council's hand and hindering negotiation, in this manner making civil war to a great extent inescapable (Bhardwaj, 2011).

2. Weak national identity

The Libyan protests and consequent conflict were caused by a weak national identity of the state because it was divided between the rebels and loyalists. The Arab Spring began in Benghazi, and the National Transitional Council's control expanded to include other tribal and rural areas. The division between the tribal groups and Tripoli, Libya's capital, was being exploited, aiding the National Transitional Council to grow armed forces nationwide (Salam, 2015). This tribal division was temporarily curtailed under the National Transitional Council’s anti-Gaddafì policy. The ability to cooperate in the different regions due to anti-elite grievance's common goal increased the National Transitional Council's national scope. The common goal helped the National Transitional Council gain home popularity and support and reduced the loyalist groups' performances. The exploitation of the nation by the government intended that in spite of frontlines, loyalist ending was a major problem and obligated forceful takeover of the military gains, encouraging the development of the protests into civil war (Bhardwaj, 2011).

3. International intervention

The international intervention was a factor that contributed to the civil war in Libya through various mechanisms (Easton, 2017). The media aided the international intervention by giving positive media to the National Transitional Council and Gaddafì's negative image to justify their actions internationally. Indeed, even in the talk that depicted Libya as a civil war as quick as February, news associations and research organizations recognized administrative restraint as a real purpose behind National Transitional Council brutality (Salam, 2015). Such talk reverberated in approach briefs and lobbyist proclamations that at last prompted UN motion through Resolution 1973 to build up a no-fly zone and enable intervention under the Responsibility to Protect to avert "widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population." This gave the framework to North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervention, which covered both the National Transitional Council's instrumental limit and the rebels against the regime, expert majority rules system character (Pedde, 2017). French connections to Libya have a range of prominence. European pushes for US contribution influenced US government policy and talked to act for mediation to help the National Transitional Council because of fears of regime drove slaughters the regime's brutality, overwhelming dubious public help. Such solid international intervention in favor of the National Transitional Council, with clear United Nations codification of National Transitional Council authenticity and North Atlantic Treaty Organization military aid, characterised and isolated the opposing sides, delegitimised Gaddafì's regime, and
opened space for an approach of National Transitional Council military assault (Bhardwaj, 2011). As a result, Gaddafi’s legacy of withdrawal from membership of international organizations coupled with the National Transitional Council’s lack of fairness to all stakeholders in negotiations and the lack of sufficient help from North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations and individual states, led to punitive regime crackdowns which worsened the crisis and evolved the uprising into full blown civil war. Consequently, the hidden state of Gaddafi’s legacy of withdrawal from the international system, joined with proximate National Transitional Council one-sided talk and ensuing instrumental and legitimate help from North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations, and individual states, gave the causal system that, following punitive regime crackdowns and National Transitional Council stage advancement, set off the Libyan clash's improvement from uprising into civil war (Bhardwaj, 2011).

Consequences of Conflicts in Libya
Like every other conflict in Africa, there were consequences to the conflict in Libya. The collapse of the Gaddafi regime left the nation with domestic, regional, and international difficulties. It created an absence of power at the national level, human rights abuse, high level of violence, racism among the different regions and tribes in the state, the collapse of the social welfare system, and economic meltdown (Salam, 2015). The collapse of the government had great effects on regional instability. For example, an enormous level of deaths and displacement of civilians, and arms proliferation spread through routes leading to neighbouring countries. It additionally has genuine ramifications for the international system. Sieben and case (2012) highlight and explain the consequences of the crisis in Libya as follows;

1. Power Vacuum
   One of the problems that arose after Gaddafi's regime's collapse was the power vacuum that existed in Libya. Libya has turned out to be ungoverned and ungovernable, as military power has turned out to be widely spread, overpowering the national army (Salam, 2015). Progressing conflicts between local armies have undermined the rule of law, the nation's security, and any form of national political solidarity. The local militias, armies, and civilians were tired of the battle, yet with no solid, dependable national authority and the sudden collapse of the central government, they found it difficult to maintain peace. The civil war in Libya transformed the state from an authoritarian system with petroleum resources that maintained the state's welfare to a tribalism-filled failed state (Easton, 2017).
   In the absence of an elective government to take control following the fall of the Gaddafi administration, the National Transitional Council went about as a selected directorate, like the Revolutionary Command Council that administered Libya following the latest coup that made laws and practiced diplomacy in the interest of a divided country over which they had set up just incomplete and unstable control (Salam, 2015). The ongoing election was commended as a stage towards democracy, yet with the lack of full cooperation proceeded with the nonattendance of important central authority and with the National Transitional Council has having denied parliament of the capacity to draft a constitution, it stays to be perceived how much the election will matter remains to be seen (Easton, 2017).

2. Human Rights Abuse, Chaos and Violence
   After the Libyan civil war, the element of chaos and violence was still obvious. Despite efforts given by international aid and counsel from other performing actors since the collapse of Gaddafi's administration, the National Transitional Council could not maintain peace and security to the faction groups and armed groups (Arraf, 2017). Chaos has more than once erupted in numerous regions of the country, such as among the Berbers and Arabs, various groups of Arabs, adversary armies, and between the National Transitional Council and difficult Gaddafi supporters. In August 2011, rebels from the town of Misrata attacked and took the western town of Tawergha. Ancient ethnic and political contrasts isolated the general population of Misrata from those in Tawergha, and the revolutionaries' expressed objective in their assault was to crush the town totally (Salam, 2015). The United Nations Human Rights Council's Commission of Inquiry on Libya later presumed that the protestors carried out violations against human rights in Tawergha, expressing that there was broad and self-assertive executing of regular folks to render the town dreadful. All things considered, a significant number of those equivalent rebels, now in armies represented up to this point by
the National Transitional Council, are as of now accountable for securing Tawerghans, who live in refugee camps across Libya (ibid).

In the opinion that the Tawerghans collaborated with Gaddafi during the war, they were banished by Misrata militias’ homes. Militias attacked a Tawerghan refugee camp in Janzur and shot civilians under weapon inspection guise in February 2012. The Tawerghans were abolished from their homes by militias from Misrata, who blamed the town's occupants of working together with Gaddafi during the period of the war. In February 2012, militias attacked a Tawerghan refugee camp in Janzur and shot people with the claim of inspecting weapons ( ). By 2012, the Gaddafi loyalists were high in number and organised, they attacked the National Transitional Council and ex-rebels, and they also created roadblocks in part of the North. They proceeded to apprehend a city (Bani Walid) with a population of 100,000 in Western Libya from the National Transitional Council. The National Transitional Council was unable to control Libya's civilians, and this was also the case with the armed group that refused to surrender to the party or join the national military. The civilians demanded the promises of openness, safety, and recompense for victims of the civil war promised by the National Transitional Council to be fulfilled as the consequences of the lawlessness were getting worse (US Department of State).

3. Discrimination

Given the level of chaos and the significant conflict present in Libyan culture after the war, the National Transitional Council neglected to give even fundamental security to the nation's 6 million individuals, and particularly for the 1.5 million remote specialists among them (Arraf, 2017). Across the board, extrajudicial slaughtering of black Africans by revolutionaries, who guaranteed their unfortunate casualties were machinery working for Gaddafi, was accounted for amid the civil war, and that incline proceeded under the National Transitional Council. In zones of the nation probably under National Transitional Council control, there have been a great many reports of severity and subjective captures by local armies, now and again bringing about torment, assault, and even synopsis execution. In one illustrative case, got on record, rebels aligned with the National Transitional Council constrained hostage black Africans into prisons confine, where they were tortured and forced to eat the previous Libyan banner, yelling (in Arabic) "Eat your flag, you dog!" (De vido, 2012) The unfortunate victim of these cruel treatments were refugees who came to Libya before the civil war and migrant workers (Salam, 2015). Human Rights Watch has warned of deeply rooted racism in Libya after the collapse of Gaddafi. In March 2012, the United Nations Commissioner on Human Rights reported that out of 100, 50% of the prisoners jailed by the National Transitional Council were black Africans and were subjected to torture, rape, and murder. The United Nations Human Rights Council's International Commission of Inquiry established that the rebels committed war crimes, abused human rights amid the civil war, and continued to commit crimes against humanity (Easton, 2015).

4. Economics

Before the war, Libya was the tenth best economy in the world (Araaf, 2017). The majority of Libya's wealth was from oil production. About Libya siphoned at a rate of 1.8 million barrels of crude every year in Libya, a significant measure of an especially high-grade caliber of oil (Easton, 2015). The legislature utilized the pay from the offer of their oil to create an advanced state and provide social welfare, massively enhancing their place in the international system, despite the 1969 revolution that occurred years ago. Before the February 2011 uprising and the ensuing civil war, Libya was, measurably, the most developed nation in Africa (Salam, 2015).

Alongside Seychelles, Libya was one of the African nations in the Human Development Index, the medium through which the United Development program, the Human Development Index, associates life expectancy, literacy, education levels, and other necessity of life into data denoted by fractions of "high human development." In the explicit parts in terms of education and life expectancy, Libya exceeded expectations resembling Western nations' features. Almost everyone in Libya had access to clean water, sanitation, and good health care (Arraf, 2017). Libya had the highest record of gross national products at purchasing price parity in the world, and it was ranked as the high middle-income nation by the World Bank in 2009 (Salam, 2015). However, since the National Transitional Council gained control of Libya, data on its development level has not been accessible, and there were obvious signs that the change in power will change the previous condition of things in Libya (Bhardwaj, 2011). Barely six (6) months after Gaddafi's death, Libya
experienced a decline by ten positions in the UNDP’S Human Development Index. Owing to the short period since the National Transitional Council overthrow and the present state of instability, adequate information on life sustainability expectancy is not likely to be known. The intervention of foreigners made the situation of Libya worse than it was. After ensuring that they put the National Transitional Council in power, member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization sought to profit from the new government of Libya which will take the form of an oil contract (Eaton, 2017). In August 2011, before the end of the Libyan civil war, oil companies in foreign countries such as France, Italy, Britain, and Austria had situated themselves to advance their present oil contracts in Libya. Gaddafi had been an eager yet tough businessman as he frequently requested for duties and charges for oil contracts, cash that went to social welfare projects, or directly to the people of Libya. In May 2012, the oil production rate in Libya went back to the pre-war level, and European oil companies such as Britain's BP were ready to get back to business (Trampus, 2012).

5. Death and displacement of civilians
The civil war in Libya and the international intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization resulted in countless numbers of deaths and displacements of civilians. Gaddafi's regime did not conform to civilian demonstrations and rebels who sought international intervention on matters of the state. He, therefore, applied violence in curbing the demonstrations. In the earlier period of the conflict between February 20 and 2nd march 2011, over 180,000 people absconded Libya (Salam, 2015). With the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's international intervention, the number of people fleeing the nation tripled with some seeking refuge in neighboring countries as the conflict increased (Marrella, 2012).

After alliance and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces entered the conflict to punish the Europeans and, Italy in particular because of their intervention under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, intervention Gaddafi made use of the increasing number of refugees as an instrument of war where he intentionally sent boats full of refugees across the Mediterranean. Although the United States and Europe sent humanitarian aid and logistical support in the early period of the war, once North Atlantic Treaty Organization engaged in the war, it could not save those that already fled the conflict (Marrella, 2012).

Saleam (2015) stated that most of the Africans who fled Libya during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization bombing died at sea in the area of North Atlantic Treaty Organization patrolled water while others died as a result of exposure and thirst as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ships stayed at a particular position. On this basis, the investigation was carried out by Amnesty International as the civilians were facing a humanitarian crisis which was a violation of international law., North Atlantic Treaty Organization, however, denied this issue. The Secretary-General, Anders Rasmussen, was questioned about an outstanding case in which sixty-eight Africans died out of exposure after recurrently signaling North Atlantic Treaty Organization ship for aid, he replied bluntly denying such allegation (Arraf, 2017).

The accurate extent of this kind of human tragedy has not been examined extensively. In light of these archived instances of insensitive dismissal for human life on the two sides amid the war, it is particularly critical to think about how much global intervention cession, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s military activity specifically, may have declined the philanthropic emergency, and on the chance that anybody can or ought to be considered dependable when it comes to interventions. To De Vido (2012), regardless of rehashed affirmations of unintended non-military personnel losses amid the war, North Atlantic Treaty Organization has neglected to direct a genuine examination of the non-military personnel setbacks caused by a large number of forays it led to assault ground forces in Libya. Huge numbers of North Atlantic Treaty Organization's airstrikes were coordinated against force in Tripoli and other generally thickly populated metropolitan zones in Libya, making inadvertent blow-back accidental consequences unavoidable. Recently, the United Nations revealed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization murdered somewhere around 60 regular folks and injured 55 others amid the intervention (De Vido, 2012).

6. Regional Instability
The collapse of the Gaddafi regime had explicit and difficult ramifications for the stability in the regions. The huge inflow of displaced persons and substantial weapons has given expanded certainty and abilities to the Tuareg rebellions at present, cutting out another nation for themselves in the North of Mali (Sieben, 2015). Tuareg civilian armies had a long-running union with Gaddafi, who offered Tuareg warriors the
chance to serve in the Libyan military as an option in contrast to engaging the government of their home countries, essentially Mali and Niger, where the Tuaregs have long felt insignificant (Security Assessment in North Africa, 2014).

Gaddafi recently arranged a détente between the administration of Niger and Tuareg rebellions in that nation, which earned him the appreciation of the two sides of that contention (Siebens, 2012). The Tuaregs have likewise been battling on and off for a considerable length of time in the North of Mali with an end goal to establish an autonomous country for their kin in a zone of the Sahara called Azawad. Nevertheless, the Libyan state's fall has transformed the low-level uprising in Mali into an all-out war of severance. Amid the Libyan civil war, the government of Mali clarified its conviction that the fall of the Gaddafi regime would seriously destabilize the district in vast part as a result of the number of Tuaregs who might probably return home from Libya in the wake of such a collapse, and along these lines focused on its help for the sort of arranged arrangement upheld by the African Union (Siebens, 2012).

7. Abuse of the Responsibility to Protect

The international intervention in Libya may have enduring ramifications for United Nations authorized humanitarian intervention and the developing standard of "Responsibility to Protect." In 2005, the United Nations member states agreed to use the phrase "Responsibility to Protect," which was approved by the Security Council to apply when involving military forces. It intended to keep the world's forces from doing nothing regardless of the glaring human rights violations such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, and torture. (Bakken and Siri, 2018). To Oliveri (2012), the intervention of the military in Libya was and is advanced as a classic R2P activity; the United Nations order approved the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to take "to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack" from Gaddafi's powers, "excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory" (Oliveri, 2012). The goals did not advocate the focus on Gaddafi's slaughtering and his family or the unlimited demolition of the Libyan military and government. The United Nations called on Libya's government to maintain its commitment under international principles to protect lives and requested a cease-fire from both sides of the conflict. To ensure obedience, the United Nations froze the assets of the Libyan government (Arraf, 2017).

These procedures would not have been taken if the United Nations Security Council expected to approve the focused on killing Libyan government authorities, or the pulverization of one side's powers to serve the other. In this manner, in principle, the United Nations Security Council approved an R2P activity only to ensure non-military personnel non-soldiers undermined with savage military power, and not to take sides in the common war. In reality, North Atlantic Treaty Organization worked as though the rebels were the civilians they had come to safeguard and treated all administration powers and offices as authentic targets paying little mind to any recognizable danger to civilians (Trampus, 2012). Toward the start of Operation Odyssey Dawn, North Atlantic Treaty Organization/alliance powers instantly started assaulting focuses on Tripoli and different parts of the nation. North Atlantic Treaty Organization participated intimately with rebel powers to enable them to continue and keep up hostile tasks. States like France, Britain, and Qatar sent cash, weapons, hardware, and at times ground powers to enable the rebels to go up against Gaddafi's prevalent powers. North Atlantic Treaty Organization and international powers led tasks far over the United Nations command to safeguard civilian life, notwithstanding venturing to such an extreme as to explicitly hurt civilians. The United Nations order was articulated extensively, sufficient to provide mediation powers with paramount adaptability as far as the strategies they used to protect civilians, including setting up a no-fly zone, which intrinsically included assaulting Libyan planes and ground-based air defense across the country. In any case, North Atlantic Treaty Organization misused and abused the international support for humanitarian aid, defended by the R2P standard, to take advantage and evacuate a long-term enemy. Confining regime change activities as R2P tasks is at last inconvenient to the validity of the states that call for and direct such activities, and of the R2P standard itself. Nonetheless, it is likewise, without a doubt, an aftereffect of how the approval for a restricted helpful mediation was misused to force a regime change in Libya (Salam, 2015).

8. Libya’s Elections
The objective of the National Transitional Council was to change Libya's system of government to democracy by guiding them until the period of the election. The Libya civil war influenced the election suspended in a lot of times due to the viciousness against the electoral process. For instance, the offices of Libya's election commission in Benghazi and Tobruk were attacked by protesters who smashed computers and burnt the ballots and ballot boxes. Another election was set for July 7, a helicopter conveying ballot was attacked by an armed group near Benghazi on July 6 in which one person died. On July 7, the parliamentary elections were conducted with 65% turnout, in spite of the boycotting of few groups. The election was tagged with violence, with numerous gunfire reports around the election area in the East and non-uniformed armies managing the election station at different areas; in a few zones of the East and south, the election stations had to be shut down. Salam (2015) stated that even though they conceded there were various instances of brutality, alongside occurrences of robbery and consuming of ballots, international spectators from Europe decided the election to be “reasonably free and fair.” The National Transitional Council officially re-separated the nation into Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan for the motivations behind parliamentary seats, demonstrating that the National Transitional Council recognized the reality of those regions disparities. The viciousness paving the way to the election, especially in and around Benghazi, has shown a solid sense among eastern Libyans that Cyrenaica should hold more power than Tripolitania in the new government. The party that emerged winner of the election was the National Forces Alliance, headed by previous Gaddafi government technocrat and deserter, Mahmoud Jibril (Salam, 2015).

Conclusion
Since independence in the late 20th century, African countries have been battling with the problem of civil wars and inter-state conflicts. This has affected the development of the continent socially, politically, and economically. The consequence of the conflicts has resulted in death and displacement of persons, violence in the regions, abuse of human rights, and so on. Libya was no exception as the civil war, which started by the Arab spring revolution in 2011 and encouraged by western powers, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ended Gaddafi’s regime and greatly affected the country economically, politically, and socially. The civil war resulted in the gross number of death of innocent civilians (human rights abuse), economic instability, racism, regional instability, and unstable control of power in politics.

Recommendations
- There is a need for democratic reform and reforms of African militaries
- Culture of peace should be promoted by AU and other regional organizations across Africa
- The sit-tight syndrome should be discouraged among African leaders
- National conferences that encourage talks on how to resolve colonial issues should be promoted in African nations
- Africa leaders need to look inward in finding solutions to African problems rather than looking for disruptive external solutions

Reference